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Abstract 
We introduce this special issue on Benjamin Gregg’s recent theory of a human rights state by 
contextualising it within current human rights scholarship and explicating its core claims, before we 
provide an overview of the eight contributions. We argue that the concept of a human rights state 
addresses two interrelated problems within human rights research by bridging the significant 
disconnect in the literature between human rights theory and practice. First, it conceives human rights 
as socially constructed norms whose reach and validity are historically contingent, depending on their 
free embrace and effective implementation by their local addressees. In this way it dispenses with the 
ever fruitless, even counterproductive attempts to advance human rights by claims about their 
putative, ultimate normative foundation. Second, it overcomes the limitations and failures of the top-
down, generally unenforceable international human rights regime with a bottom-up alternative: the 
human rights state as a metaphorical polity in which activists promote human rights-friendly change 
within the corresponding nation state. In each case of such a metaphorical polity, a network of self-
selected activists within the nation state promotes the free embrace of self-authored human rights 
through incorporating those rights in the nation state’s legal and political system. Subsequently, 
aspirations to an international human rights law would finally be redeemed as effective norms through 
the overlapping agreement among more and more political communities that have freely embraced 
their self-authored human rights and institutionalised them at local levels. 
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Social scientific research advances through the development and discussion of new theories, new 
concepts, new arguments. This special issue seeks to advance the interdisciplinary field of human 
rights research through a critical, multi-perspectival discussion of a new concept: the ‘human rights 
state’. As the normative ideal of a cosmopolitan, human rights-based alternative to the contemporary 
nation state, the social and political theorist Benjamin Gregg first articulated the notion of the human 
rights state in his widely discussed book Human Rights as Social Construction.1  In his recent 
publication The Human Rights State: Justice Within and Beyond Sovereign Nations,2 Gregg revised 
the concept into a comprehensive proposal for a very particular kind of social movement that pursues 
human rights change through the politics of metaphor.  
 This special issue is the first collection of articles that scrutinise the idea of a human rights 
state and critically explore its potential for advancing both the theory and practice of human rights. 
The idea to collect and publish these critical replies first developed in an international seminar hosted 
by the Glasgow Human Rights Network (GHRN) in May 2015, in which a diverse group of 
researchers and practitioners discussed the not-yet-published manuscript of The Human Rights State 
among themselves and with the author. Most of the contributions in this special issue flow from that 
conversation at the University of Glasgow, a conversation since then continued in different forms 
across many different countries. Before introducing the themes and arguments of the articles collected 
here, we first prepare the ground for this sprawling debate. We contextualise Gregg’s theory of the 
human rights state in the wider field of human rights research and explicate its key features. 
 
The human rights state in the context of human rights scholarship 
 
The concept of the human rights state directly responds to both a theoretical and a practical problem. 
First, it replies to the insular and often exclusionary tendencies in philosophical attempts to explain 
and justify human rights. Second, it addresses the limits of the contemporary international human 
rights regime to achieve effective and sustainable human rights change within nation states around 
the world. The theory of the human rights state offers a conceptual solution to both problems by 
bridging the significant disconnect between them. 
  
Breaking through the metaphysical limbo of legitimation: human rights as social constructions 
 
In the history of the human rights movement, the intellectual force of the human rights idea has always 
depended on the belief that ‘rights exist as moral demands that need to be translated into legal and 
institutional contexts’.3 This idea continues to be compelling particularly in contexts where people 
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cannot rely on legal or political institutions. Philosophical ideas of the European Enlightenment, such 
as natural law, reason, equality and liberty, laid the ground for modern human rights reasoning––and, 
consequently, for the rise of human rights discourse as a global language giving voice to struggles 
for social justice. These notions demonstrably informed the drafters of the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. 4  Across the range of today’s multidisciplinary human rights scholarship, 
philosophy usually tasks itself with analysing possible normative foundations for the human rights 
project.5 By explaining how we should conceive of human rights, and by providing arguments for 
why we should want to protect them, philosophers would reinforce the individual’s capacity for 
claiming human rights as entitlements even, or especially, in seemingly hopeless situations. This work 
is ‘crucially important’ 6  to justifying the idea of human rights and criticising social, political, 
economic and cultural conditions that violate this capacity.7 
 And yet over the last three decades philosophers have sent human rights scholarship into a 
metaphysical limbo of claims and counter-claims about the source, validity and scope of human 
rights. Engaged in often fruitless ‘competition to provide a better, more persuasive foundation for the 
universal legitimacy of human rights’ with ‘allegedly less demanding assumptions’,8 scholars in fact 
construct ever more boundaries on the horizon of this limbo as human rights philosophy grows 
increasingly estranged from human rights practice, forsaking its own particular role in advancing the 
human rights project. 9  No universal basis of legitimacy that might render human rights more 
accessible, and no compelling answers that could inform new strategies and techniques to advance 
human rights practice, have ever emerged in this landscape. This metaphysical limbo only ‘works 
against the human rights project by leading to positions that exclude some groups of people from 
human rights’.10 Consider five examples. 
 The legal theorist Michael Perry rejects secular understandings of human rights as thoroughly 
implausible as such. He insists that human rights necessarily require belief in God and recognition of 
what he takes to be the ‘sacredness’ inherent in every person.11 According to ethicist James Griffin, 
by contrast, human rights are grounded not in the individual’s species membership but in his or her 
‘personhood’, his or her capacity as an autonomous, ‘functioning human agent’.12 Hence ‘[i]nfants, 
the severely mentally retarded, [and] people in an irreversible coma’13 possess no human rights. For 
Jean-François Lyotard, a scholar of postmodernism, people achieve human rights––or at least the 
foundational ‘right to speak’––by freeing themselves of their ‘animal nature’ through a process of 
cultural civilisation.14 For the communitarian scholar, Amitai Etzioni, citizens of liberal democracies 
realise human rights fully by freeing themselves from the influence of ‘alcohol, drugs’, or a ‘high 
dose of mass culture’ that renders them, like the ‘mentally handicapped’, ‘blind to even the most 
shining normative light’.15 Finally, the noted philosopher of political liberalism, John Rawls, regards 
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human rights-abiding communities as morally obliged to subject ‘outlaw regimes’ to the rule of 
‘reasonable and just law’––by military intervention, if necessary––in this way finally to overcome 
the enduring state of nature in world politics.16  
 Ensnared as they are among the conflicting imperatives of almost any understanding of human 
rights––the imperatives of coherence, rational persuasiveness and accessibility––these few examples 
immediately demonstrate that the ‘metaphysical limbo of intractable debates over nature, source, 
contents, and entailments of human rights […] generates puzzlements, not answers’.17 Rather than 
enhancing people’s moral imagination, instead of providing an inclusive vocabulary of social justice, 
these arguments in their never resolved competition with each other end up contributing to the 
isolation of philosophical discourse from the practical tasks of human rights advocacy. 
 The theory of the human rights state, by contrast, construes human rights as socially 
constructed, hence as a political project still to be undertaken. The theory offers a vision of a new 
strategy for human rights activism. At the centre of this strategy is the human rights state itself, ‘a 
metaphorical polity constituted by interested, self-selected members of a corresponding nation 
state’.18 The members of this polity author their own human rights, which they recognise and observe 
among themselves while they pursue the incorporation of these human rights within the domestic 
constitution of the corresponding nation state. The members advance the free embrace of these self-
authored rights beginning with their local communities and then spreading outward, overlapping with 
other locally instantiated communities of human rights advocates, with the ultimate goal of 
persuading the political and legal systems of the corresponding nation state to institutionalise human 
rights effectively in the sense of state-recognised, state-enforced legal norms reinforced by the nation 
state’s political culture.19 
 
The human rights state as both complement and alternative to international human rights law 
 
Apart from providing an alternative conceptual and normative foundation of human rights grounded 
in the social practice of norm construction, the theory of the human rights state proposes a unique 
form of activism towards human rights-friendly change within nation states, indeed on a local level 
with the self-motivated participation of ordinary people. It envisions a network of self-selected 
activists promoting the free embrace of self-authored human rights by political communities and, 
eventually, the realisation of these rights through juridification: their incorporation into the nation 
state’s legal and political system. In this way it responds to the inherent limits and practical failures 
of the international human rights regime––problems confirmed by recent studies across the field. 
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 While many scholars have long assumed that the international codification of human rights 
would automatically yield positive effects around the world,20 recent scholarship casts doubt on the 
efficacy of international human rights law and its various organisations. Scholars have documented 
an ever-widening gap between the willingness of state governments to ratify human rights treaties, 
on the one hand, and little if any commitment to implement these rights effectively, on the other.21 
They have bemoaned the inherent ineffectiveness of international human rights law,22 and they have 
monitored and criticised the tendency of Western states to justify imperialist foreign policies with the 
need to protect international human rights standards.23  
 The notion of human rights as local social constructs24 that underlies the idea of the human 
rights state tackles these problems in several ways. It rejects the idea of human rights as a 
metaphysical or theological given that is valid a priori. It does not see human rights as a gratuitous 
grant from one elite or another (such as the United Nations or other international organisations). It 
does not regard them as consensually understood, immediately enforceable and everywhere valid 
rights somehow called into existence by their mere proclamation in any of a number of declarations 
(which agree with each other only in part and none of which is free of some incoherence). It views 
with scepticism claims that human rights have achieved an effective status in international law that 
is recognised and enforced across national boundaries even and especially in opposition to regimes 
that violate human rights, regimes that may or may not reject human rights as such or the particular 
version preferred by would-be interveners (as if there were such interveners). Further, the notion of 
human rights as local social constructs understands the idea of universally valid norms as a 
contingent, historical achievement to which advocates aspire, rather than as a moral realm not of 
human hand yet discoverable by special persons or particular worldviews. 
 To locate human rights as authored by the very persons to whom they apply––and to construe 
the meanings of human rights, their concrete applications and possible validity in intersubjectively 
shared understandings of particular political communities––is not to reject the potential of the idea of 
international human rights law. Rather, it is to understand that potential as yet to be realised. It is to 
understand that potential as one day realisable because nation states will have incorporated human 
rights freely into their own domestic legal systems and political cultures, rendering international law 
more or less reflective of domestic conviction and for that reason, among others, finding some degree 
of domestic enforcement. It is to understand international human rights law as a norm developed 
bottom up, from domestic populations faithfully represented by domestic elites, rather than as a norm 
imposed, top down, by foreign powers and hostile forces.  
 In short, the notion of a human rights state bridges theory and practice by overcoming two 
bottlenecks that have bedevilled the human rights project. First, it dispenses with a decades-long 
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search for ultimate foundations, a search that cannot succeed and that wastes efforts better spent on 
advancing what hardly requires otherworldly validation anyway.25 Unlike idle theoretical efforts 
unable to recognise the moral adequacy of humankind’s capacity to give itself norms for the just 
treatment of others, this notion encourages human rights activism, beginning with norm construction 
by the actual addressees of any plausible human right. Second, the device of a human rights state can 
do work that international law cannot: it can generate a local commitment to human rights on the part 
of ordinary people. It can contribute, then, to the likelihood that human rights norms will be observed 
locally (and the local venue is always the primary venue for human rights practice). And it may be 
able to steer the nation state in human rights-supportive directions because it comes from within the 
nation state, as a product of citizens, rather than something advocated and imposed by distant, foreign 
elites. 
 
The special issue 
 
In their diversity in perspective and argumentation, the articles comprising this special issue reflect 
the multidisciplinarity of human rights research as well as the fact that Gregg’s theory of the human 
rights state itself feeds on, and speaks to, different bodies of literature within this proliferating field. 
We have here analytical paradigms and disciplinary lenses that range from sociology, political science 
and philosophy to education, law, history and religious studies. Some articles combine multiple 
perspectives.  
 These articles are also representative of a growing interest of scholars and practitioners in 
alternative theories, justifications and strategies to advance the human rights project. As scholars 
identify the multiple weaknesses and constraints of the current international human rights regime 
(some authors even perceive ‘the endtimes of human rights’26), academics and activists alike are 
searching for new ways to facilitate human rights beyond existing institutions and the usual 
mechanisms of human rights protection. In that spirit, the contributions to this special issue scrutinise 
the theory of a human rights state with an eye to its potential for informing empirical human rights 
research and advancing human rights practice. They do not simply adopt or apply the theory as it 
stands but engage it in critical dialogue, and some suggest ways to extend or revise it in light of 
specific national case studies or other practical experiences in the field.  
 Discernable within this diversity of approaches, however, are several overarching themes that 
run through the various authors’ arguments. In one way or another, they focus on the liberal 
individualistic foundations of the human rights idea as well as of the human rights state; they examine 
the core concept of a human rights cognitive style; and they analyse the merits and drawbacks of 
 7 
Gregg’s prioritisation of the free embrace of locally defined human rights norms. One recurring 
subject of debate in this special issue is the relationship between Gregg’s normative localism, on the 
one hand, and existing norms and institutions of the contemporary international human rights regime, 
on the other. With each article examining the idea of a human rights state through its own unique 
lens, taken together the contributions offer a series of insights, each original yet all interrelated. They 
establish a variety of starting points, again interrelated, for an ongoing conversation critically probing 
the theory’s possible benefits as well as its inevitable shortcomings. 
 This special issue begins with two articles each of which, with very different objectives, 
address the conceptual and theoretical side of a human rights state. In ‘The Institutionalisation of 
Human Rights Reconceived: The Human Rights State as a Sociological “Ideal Type”’, 27  René 
Wolfsteller deploys the human rights state as a vehicle for constructing a framework for the empirical 
sociological study of human rights institutionalisation. Drawing on Gregg’s original formulation of 
the human rights state as a hypothetical alternative to the nation state,28 Wolfsteller reconceptualises 
Gregg’s normative political theory as a Weberian ideal type. It identifies the necessary structural 
conditions for the effective institutionalisation of human rights as locally valid, state-based norms of 
social justice. If understood, in distinction to Gregg’s formulation, as a non-prescriptive concept that 
can be abstracted from selected elements of actual human rights practice, the ideal type of the human 
rights state can guide the qualitative study of empirical factors in institutionalising human rights 
within states. The ideal type then serves as both analytical grid and benchmark for the critical 
evaluation of these empirical factors. It allows for normative distance to the institutions of the 
international human rights regime. And it corrects for the excessive positivism of the largely 
quantitative body of evaluative literature that conceptualises human rights institutionalisation simply 
as formal compliance with the norms of international law. 
 In ‘“Achieved Not Given”: Human Rights, Critique and the Need for Strong Foundations’,29 
Yingru Li and John McKernan scrutinise, from the perspective of moral philosophy, the normative 
foundation of Gregg’s theory of a human rights state. They argue that the anti-foundationalist and 
pragmatist conceptualisation of human rights that underlies Gregg’s theory limits its potential to 
criticise relevant forms of injustice. The authors rework Gregg’s justification of human rights by 
drawing on Rainer Forst, where he speaks of humans’ inherent quality as autonomous moral persons 
who enjoy a natural right to demand and receive reasonable justification for all actions, rules and 
structures to which they are subject. According to Li and McKernan, grounding human rights in the 
individual’s moral right to justification releases the true potential of a human rights state to identify 
and criticise unjustifiable political constructions. It also allows the theory to extend its reach beyond 
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any state-based law to include contexts of business and corporate behaviour, contexts enormously 
relevant to the human rights project and too often underestimated if not ignored. 
 Then follow three articles, each of which explore conceptual elements of the theory in terms 
of a particular nation state. In ‘The Human Rights Project and the Transformation of Social (B)orders: 
On the Political Nature of Human Rights Activism in the Wake of the Zapatista Uprising’,30 Richard 
Georgi analyses the normative prerequisites of Gregg’s human rights state theory. He suggests 
extending it so as to account for some of the ways in which human rights activism, premised on the 
liberal individualism of the European Enlightenment, may in fact ‘aggravate protracted social 
conflicts and contribute to their violent escalation’.31 By contrast, the theory of the human rights state, 
and the empowering device of a human rights cognitive style in particular, aim at an inclusionary 
politics of persuasion, presupposing a communicative model in which the freedom of each 
autonomous participant is the condition for the freedom of every other autonomous participant. 
Drawing on Gayatri Spivak, Georgi objects to what he takes to be the theory’s implicit presumption 
of a liberal individualist subjectivity and a rights-based culture. He argues that this presumption fails 
to understand large parts of postcolonial societies in the Global South, where the springs of social 
solidarity lie in responsibility and kinship, not in rights and individualism. A human rights project 
reconfigured in its self-understanding to include these communities––communities it heretofore 
overlooked––would require a transformation of social order more profound than Gregg 
acknowledges. Examining different forms of human rights activism during the Zapatista uprising in 
Mexico in the 1990s, Georgi argues that human rights activists will only hear the voices of perpetually 
excluded, subaltern communities if they listen for both reconciling and antagonising strategies in 
human rights advocacy. He therefore reworks Gregg’s theory towards acknowledging the sometimes 
deeply conflictual nature of human rights activism, towards recognising the diversity in potentially 
legitimate strategies of activism, to render the human rights project accessible for otherwise excluded 
communities in Mexico and elsewhere in the Global South. 
 Ulisses Terto Neto applies Gregg’s idea of the human rights state as a social movement in 
‘Democracy, Social Authoritarianism, and the Human Rights State Theory: Towards Effective 
Citizenship in Brazil’. 32  Although Brazil is a constitutional democracy that has ratified major 
international human rights treaties, social authoritarian structures within state and society discourage 
the effective implementation of human rights norms. Terto Neto suggests establishing a political 
coalition of human rights organisations within civil society to create a metaphorical human rights 
state to challenge the nation state to recognise human rights. This Brazilian human rights state would 
advocate an egalitarian, democratic society composed of individuals who recognise each other as 
human rights bearers. In this way it would facilitate a domestic human rights culture and encourage 
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state actors to adopt human rights-compliant behaviour. Terto Neto also argues that such a human 
rights state, understood as a national campaign for domestic human rights change, can only be based 
on the norms of international human rights law. Symbolic authority and political leverage, he 
suggests, can and must draw from the government’s ratification of international human rights treaties. 
 Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić advocate the adoption of a human rights culture in ‘The 
Human Rights State and Freedom of Religion in Southeastern Europe: The Case of Bosnia-
Herzegovina’.33 Only such a culture might bridge the ethno-religious conflicts in southeast European 
societies re-inventing themselves in the post-communist era. While secularised society in Tito’s 
communist Yugoslavia formally recognised freedom of religion, which then disappeared from public 
life, since the wars of the 1990s over religious belief and ethnicity have become politicised and 
intertwined in today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the absence of an effective domestic constitution, 
the authors argue, the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 and international human rights treaties 
function as a substitute for a domestic constitution, yet the agreement and its spirit remain distant to 
the local community, deeply divided along ethno-religious lines. To overcome that division, 
Ognjenović and Jozelić propose a new common ethos for multicultural Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
They imagine an ethos based on locally defined, freely embraced cosmopolitan values. Gregg’s vision 
of the human rights state might lead the way to that common ethos if a human rights state could be 
incorporated into the education system, in this way to help socialise younger generations into a human 
rights cognitive style. 
 The final two contributions discuss aspects of Gregg’s theory in the context of various 
practical problems, but also prospects, of human rights universalism in a world of profound moral 
difference. Johannes Hendrik Fahner challenges Gregg’s assertion that the right to democratic 
government lacks universal authority and should be decoupled from the human rights project, in this 
way not to undermine at least minimal human rights change in nondemocratic communities (which, 
after all, compose the largest number of states in the world today). Based on the analysis of 
international human rights treaties and selected case law, Fahner’s contribution ‘Revisiting the 
Human Right to Democracy: A Positivist Analysis’34 shows that democratic government is widely 
recognised as a standard of positive international law. According to this standard, states, even in their 
great diversity, are all obliged to let citizens take part in political decision-making and to conduct free 
elections. Fahner also demonstrates that, even though many governments reject a purported right to 
democracy, such a right can be successfully invoked before international judicial and quasi-judicial 
bodies to address failures in the provision of equal political participation even and especially within 
nondemocratic communities. And regardless of this issue of legal positivism, Fahner argues that 
Gregg’s idea of the free local embrace of human rights by political communities can only be realised 
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through processes of democratic decision-making. Their social construction––in ways local, 
decentralised, and democratic––would account for the dynamic, contingent nature of moral 
convictions as well as for legitimate differences in the adoption and interpretation of human rights 
among different communities across the globe. The free local embrace of human rights in general is 
then best secured by recognising and implementing a human right to democracy. 
 In their ‘Note from the Field: Applying a “Human Rights Cognitive Style” in the Raoul 
Wallenberg Institute’s Work on Human Rights Education with Universities’,35 Olga Bezbozhna and 
Helena Olsson explore the potential of Gregg’s theory to inform practical strategies in their 
collaboration with universities across the globe. For Bezbozhna and Olsson, the greatest challenge in 
their work with institutions of higher education is to facilitate positive attitudinal change toward 
human rights. While they criticise Gregg’s normative localist approach in defining and recognising 
human rights as a counter-productive dilution of international standards, they see great potential in 
his conception of a human rights consciousness as a particular human rights cognitive style. To 
develop a perspective that recognises individuals as worthy of human rights even in contexts that 
merit the greatest scepticism, a human rights cognitive style must converse with local cognitive styles. 
Drawing on examples from their collaboration with the Belarusian State University, Bezbozhna and 
Olsson show how the concepts and strategies developed by Gregg might be translated and 
contextualised in university teaching. These concepts and strategies might then be deployed also in 
non-Western, nondemocratic countries, in this way to facilitate a free local embrace of human rights 
norms even beyond liberal democratic communities. 
 In the concluding ‘Reply to My Critics’,36 Benjamin Gregg responds to the criticisms and 
suggestions put forward by the several contributions to this special issue, focusing on several 
overarching themes. One is normativity. In response to Wolfsteller, he urges sensitivity to the 
unavoidable interpretability in the deployment of any analytic tool that would measure degrees in the 
practical implementation of human rights: to interpret is to apply norms, yet value-neutral 
measurement in Wolfsteller’s terms is not possible. In response to Li and McKernan, he rejects the 
notion that any normativity at all presupposes a specifically transcendental normativity (and shows 
how a this-worldly form of validity can be effective). Another theme concerns the nature of groups 
in the project to advance human rights. Gregg discusses Georgi’s notion of group rights in a potential 
Mexican human rights state and stresses the need for individual rights in the face of group oppression. 
With respect to Terto Neto’s conception of a Brazilian human rights state, he argues that the relevant 
scale of group rights is national not global. And he responds to Ognjenović and Jozelić’s depiction 
of a Bosnian-Herzegovinian human rights state by stressing the danger inherent in a core goal of the 
human rights project: intersubjectively shared norms. Any norm is vulnerable to manipulation that 
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violates its intended ends, and this holds all the more so for group norms. A third theme concerns the 
extent to which the human rights project should orient itself not on its aspiration to universal reach 
and validity but on the practical work that is relative to any given venue and context. In response to 
Fahner, Gregg argues that the rule of law, but not democracy, is universally necessary for the local 
possibility of human rights. And he shows that the Raoul Wallenberg Institute’s practical work in 
advancing human rights, as portrayed by Bezbozhna and Olsson, in fact operates with a notion of 
moral relativism even as it ultimately seeks moral universalism. At the end of his Reply, Gregg draws 
on each of the contributions to sketch possible directions for future research programmes on the idea 
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